Hostile Gesture. Who does not want to take a “brave and revolutionary nation” into BRICS?

Brazil's veto of Venezuela's BRICS entry exposes deeper geopolitical shifts, U.S. influences, and historical tensions. By Leonid Savin, renowned geopolitical analyst and chief editor of Geopolitika.ru

Brazil's decision to veto Venezuela's entry into BRICS announced at the organization's summit in Kazan, surprised many observers. The Bolivarian Republic's Foreign Ministry called the demarche “a hostile gesture added to the criminal policy of sanctions imposed on a brave and revolutionary people.”

On October 30, Venezuela recalled its ambassador, Manuel Wedel, from Brazil for consultations over the crisis caused both by the said veto and by doubts among neighbors about the legitimacy of President Nicolas Maduro's re-election. In response, the Brazilian Charge d'Affaires was summoned to the Venezuelan Foreign Ministry.

The previous day, October 29, during a speech in the Brazilian Parliament, the president's chief advisor and former Foreign Minister Celso Amorim insisted that his country would not recognize Maduro's victory because of the “lack of transparency” of the election. The advisor, who was an observer at Venezuela's July 28 presidential election, explained that the reluctance to see the country in BRICS is a response to Venezuela's eroding credibility during the election.

Venezuelan Foreign Minister Ivan Gil responded by saying that Amorim is behaving “like a messenger of U.S. imperialism,” which has led him in recent weeks to “make value judgments about processes that apply only to Venezuelans and their democratic institutions.”

In a statement, Venezuelan National Assembly President Jorge Rodriguez accused Amorim of repeating phrases from U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan like a maniac. Rodriguez also said he would seek to have Amorim declared persona non grata.

What are the real reasons behind Brazil's decision?

It would seem that both countries have leftist governments, among the 13 new BRICS partner countries there is even a Turkey, which is part of the NATO alliance.

Argentine philosopher Atilio Boron notes two main reasons for the conflict. First, Brazil's Foreign Ministry has “relative autonomy” and can make decisions independently of the president. This allows it to act in sync with U.S. foreign policy and conform to it if not even help directly.

This leads to the phenomenon of sub-imperialism, where Brazil serves the interests of Washington's hegemony and acts as a deterrent to the independent policies of the countries in the region. In return, the US gives it certain quotas in international organizations.

Secondly, Brazil and Venezuela had historical differences on several issues, and relations were normalized by international standards only recently, in 2005, after the U.S. failed to push through the ALCA agreement on the creation of the Free Trade Area of the Americas.

At that time, the interests of Venezuela, as well as Bolivia, Brazil, and Argentina, coincided. Former Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez promoted his similar project, the ALBA alliance, and called the creation of ALCA a plan of annexation and a tool of imperialism to exploit Latin America. A similar statement was made by then-Bolivian President Evo Morales.

Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Nestor Kirchner, then presidents of Brazil and Argentina respectively, demanded that the U.S. eliminate agricultural subsidies so that products from Latin America could be competitive in their markets.

However, despite the leftist rhetoric of Lula and the Brazilian Labor Party and the seemingly general movement of Latin American countries toward continental integration, the Brazilian leadership has done little for truly effective cooperation.

When the Bank of the South (Banco del Sur), common to Latin American countries, was founded in December 2007, it was Brazil that blocked its operations, effectively drowning the work in a pointless bureaucracy. Brazil also suspended Venezuela's membership in the Mercosur association. Although this was a joint decision with Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay, it was Brazil that made the main contribution.

Washington had previously actively used Brazil as an intermediary to influence Hugo Chavez. For example, in 2005, the day before U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice arrived in Brazil, Lula sent the head of his cabinet, Jose Dirceu, to Caracas. Given his guerrilla past and good relations with Fidel Castro, Lula's minister had to convince Chavez not to interrupt the military cooperation agreement Venezuela has had with the United States for 30 years.

This would have been a broad gesture by Brazil toward the United States and would have demonstrated that there would be no escalation in its relations with Venezuela and that Brazil could take care of containing Chavez. There was nothing Lula could do for America then.

Given that Nicolas Maduro is pursuing a foreign policy that builds on the foundations laid by Hugo Chavez, both in terms of relations with allies such as Iran, the DPRK, and Russia, as well as with those who hold differing views, it seems likely that Lula will seek to assist the US in achieving its goals.

Experts also note that Lula's weakness is evident in his rejection of Venezuela. His Labor Party is only one of the members of the government coalition and is not united inside: there are moderate and even relatively right-wing groups. And for all his leftist rhetoric, the president must maintain a certain balance both within his party and within the ruling coalition.

Also, the current conflict shows the Brazilians' desire for hegemony in the Latin American region. And Venezuela's entry into BRICS would undermine the interests of some Brazilian economic players. For example, Venezuela's oil reserves may well compete with Brazil's, from where a good part of its oil goes directly to the United States.

Brazil's dual position is also evident in the fact that the BRICS partner countries include Bolivia and Cuba, both of which are also subject to U.S. sanctions. Therefore, the veto discredits Brazil and positions it as yet another actor working for the disintegration of Latin America rather than for unification and solidarity.

If the Venezuela-Brazil-Argentina axis had been created, it would have given the region a strong unifying impetus. But Argentina, under the rule of Javier Milei, refused to join BRICS at all and is an open client of Washington. And now Brazil looks like a country slipping into the camp of supporters of the weakening unipolarity.

Add to this Lula's strange stance on the conflict in Ukraine. He tries to maintain neutrality, but he plays along with the collective West, refusing to recognize Kyiv's crimes and the role of NATO countries in this proxy war against Russia.

To add to this, the Nicaraguan ambassador was expelled from Brasilia earlier, which once again demonstrates the indulgence of U.S. interests in the region.

Venezuela has traditionally played a key role in the integration of the Global South and is an important geopolitical player that can and should play a role in building a new multipolar world. It is absurd and harmful to try to oppose its integration into structures that promote multipolarity.

By the way, Venezuelan Vice President Delcy Rodriguez said on October 31 that her country will develop bilateral ties with all BRICS members because it is in their interests. Probably without taking Brazil into account for now, at least until the veto scandal is resolved and relations are normalized.

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About the Author:

Leonid Savin is a seasoned geopolitical analyst, serving as Chief Editor of Geopolitika.ru since 2008 and founder of the Journal of Eurasian Affairs. He leads the International "Eurasian Movement" and previously edited Katehon magazine. He directs a development forecasting foundation, is part of Russia's Military-Scientific Society, and has authored numerous geopolitical and political philosophy books published globally in countries such as the UK, Italy, and Brazil. Original article.