Between Multipolarity and Multilateralism: The Great Rebalancing
As economic power shifts, the BRICS nations are challenging Western concepts of multilateralism and ushering in a multipolar world order.
As the tides of economic power shift, long-held perspectives on multilateralism and global governance are being reimagined by emerging powers. At the heart of this transformation lie the BRICS nations whose ascent has ushered in an era of "multipolarity."
Multilateralism, the principle of cooperating through international institutions and rules-based frameworks, has long been championed by established powers like the European Union and the United States. However, as Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg highlights, this Western-centric approach is increasingly at odds with developing countries' priorities. Goldberg argues that the assumption multilateralism exclusively benefits multinational corporations over the average citizen in poorer nations is fueling discontent.
Intellectual property rules, agricultural subsidies favoring advanced economies, and efforts to link trade to environmental standards are seen by many developing states as impediments to their growth aspirations.
Highlighting these tensions, on April 17th the BRICS Competition Centre together with the HSE University in Russia will hold a roundtable titled "Is There a Demand for Competition Policy Today?" The event, part of a broader economic conference, will explore whether traditional competition and antitrust frameworks remain relevant amid today's global fragmentation, digitalization challenges requiring new regulatory approaches, and geopolitical frictions. Just as competition law historically helped drive economic transformations from post-war Europe to China's opening up, the roundtable will assess its modern-day importance and possible conceptualization.
The BRICS, driven by national economic imperatives, appear to embrace a more conditional multilateralism – accepting global rules and institutions when convenient, but prioritizing self-interest over excessive entanglement. China's "selective" multilateralism epitomizes this mindset, rooted in a struggle between identities as a developing nation focused on economic progress, and as an ascendant superpower expected to uphold a "normative" multilateralism of shared rules and values.
This fluid approach aligns with the BRICS's overarching vision of a "multipolar" world order no longer dominated by the US and its allies. While the extent and implications of this transition remain unclear, the World Bank has predicted the BRICS's economic rise will induce major shifts in global power dynamics.
As this tug-of-war between traditional and emerging perspectives plays out, tangible outcomes are already materializing through strengthened economic ties among BRICS members. A prime example is the booming trade between China's industrial powerhouse Jiangsu Province and regional partners like India and Brazil, which soared 36% year-on-year in early 2024 to over $14 billion.
This commercial vigor is poised to accelerate through the New Development Bank (NDB) established by the BRICS in 2015. Aiming to provide $5 billion in loans this year alone, the NDB is financing major infrastructure programs across sectors like renewable energy and urban development – domains historically underfunded by Western-dominated institutions.
The significance of the bank extends beyond economics. Its very existence symbolizes the BRICS's pursuit of financial self-reliance and rejection of a US/Europe-centric international order. The NDB's rising clout underscores developing economies' growing willingness to chart their own multilateral path.
Whether this trajectory will lead to a fragmentation of global governance or merely its rebalancing remains hotly debated. But one outcome seems clear: the BRICS's economic ascent is catalyzing a normative challenge to Western concepts of multilateralism deeply rooted in their unique development imperatives.
As former Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff, now heading the NDB, recently affirmed in exploring potential loans to Argentina's Buenos Aires province, "Strengthening ties with the [BRICS] organization is essential to continue providing answers and transforming the lives of the people."
This quest to transform multilateral frameworks from a developing-world lens reflects the BRICS's conviction that only a truly multipolar world order infused with their values and interests can ensure an equitable path to shared prosperity. How this vision coalesces in an increasingly multipolar reality remains to be seen, but its ramifications for entrenched global governance norms are already reverberating across the geopolitical landscape.
If you read Glenn Diesen’s new book “Ukraine War & Eurasian World Order” (FEB 2024, I am only at the beginning) it is interesting to note that the US post-WW2 for its growing hegemony encouraged conflicts in Eurasia as a means of maintaining lead control of region’s resources. This is similar to UK highlighting regional differences in West Europe during peak of their power.
BRICS+ will inevitably come into conflict with US-dominated West as it encourages a model of competition where Eurasian and African players prioritize their own continued development. The US’ main strategy was always going to be controlling West Europe through NATO/EU, Central Asia through Saudis/Israel and East Asia through Japan.
As their anchors of **control** in these regions (West, Central and East Eurasia) falter, encouraging **instability** switches to being major way of US staying ahead in what they see as a zero-sum competition for control against any potential peer.
Major EU nations like Germany or Turkey drawing closer to Russia, Saudis drawing closer to Central Asian neighbors like Iran, and Japan getting closer to other East Asian neighbors is an inherent threat to US hegemony that will never be allowed. That would be best for those countries, but the world needs more time.