Snapback' Returns Sanctions Against Iran

The UN Security Council has reactivated sanctions on Iran via the snapback mechanism, escalating tensions over its nuclear program and complicating fragile diplomacy amid global geopolitical divides.

After a decade-long break, the UN Security Council has restored sanctions against Iran, as provided for by six resolutions (1696, 1737, 1747, 1803, 1835, and 1929) from the 2006-2010 period. These sanctions prohibit uranium enrichment and reprocessing, arms supplies, and Iran’s acquisition of technologies for its space sector and missile program. Furthermore, previous restrictions in the oil and gas and banking sectors have returned. The sanctions came into force on the night of September 28, with the so-called “Euro-three” (E3) initiating them by activating the snapback mechanism. Against this backdrop, Tehran has already recalled its ambassadors to the UK, France, and Germany for consultations.

The “snapback” mechanism is part of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), adopted in 2015 by Iran and six external guarantors: the USA, Russia, China, the UK, France, and Germany (the so-called “Euro-three”). Its key task is to ensure the sustainability and transparency of the nuclear deal, as well as to create a lever of pressure on Tehran in the form of the return of UN sanctions, motivating it to fulfill its commitments.

According to paragraph 11 of the JCPOA, any deal participant is empowered to notify the Security Council of “significant non-performance of commitments” by Iran—regardless of their degree of involvement in the negotiation process. Moreover, not a single permanent member of the Security Council can prevent the restoration of sanctions via “snapback,” even with the right of veto. This provision was theoretically supposed to eliminate the risk of the mechanism turning into a tool for political manipulation.

However, the opposite happened — the anti-Iran initiative was launched by Western countries essentially unilaterally. The prohibition of vetoing embedded in the mechanism allowed the “Euro-three” to see the bureaucratic procedure through to the end. This succeeded despite resistance from Russia and China and their attempts to introduce alternative resolutions. For instance, on September 26, the UN Security Council rejected a joint resolution from Moscow and Beijing to extend the term of the Iranian nuclear deal by six months. This was their attempt to prevent the restoration of international sanctions against Tehran.

Thus, Iran has effectively returned to the interim status quo of 2010, when diplomatic and economic pressure on the country was near its maximum. However, an important caveat is necessary here: the previous sanctions were introduced during the rule of the “militant ultra-conservative” Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a time when Tehran periodically demonstrated ambiguous steps on the nuclear track and was not overly active in seeking agreements with external players. The reformist wing, headed by the current President Masoud Pezeshkian, adheres to a different approach. Official Tehran was ready to return to the deal with minimal conditions, demanding only that the mistakes of the “first version” of the JCPOA be accounted for and that the non-exit of the USA and other guarantors from the new agreement be guaranteed.

Nevertheless, the “Euro-three” deemed Iran’s aspirations insufficient and used “snapback” first as an intimidation tool, threatening to activate it from the middle of summer 2025 if Tehran did not accept the West’s current terms, and then as a means of direct pressure.

The Future of the Nuclear Deal

The restoration of sanctions against Iran has complicated the already unstable negotiation background surrounding its nuclear program. Finding itself in the position of the attacked party, Tehran has effectively lost the motivation to strive for dialogue. New backstage agreements reached in Saudi Arabia, Oman, and the UAE (where Iranian and Western officials and scientists authorized to deal with this issue arrived in turn) had already ceased to correspond to the international situation by the end of September.

And although the “negotiation window” is still officially not closed — Oman, Turkey, and Egypt still offer the parties a platform for new meetings—significant breakthroughs in the dialogue can no longer be expected. The last attempt to reach a deal was made less than 24 hours before the activation of the “snapback.” The USA was willing to give Iran a three-month delay before restoring sanctions in exchange for the transfer of the republic’s existing stockpiles of highly enriched uranium. Tehran, expectedly, rejected this proposal.

Judging by the reaction of European officials, the West did not really count on Tehran’s pliability and now intends to “press through exhaustion.” In this sense, the positions of the USA and the “Euro-three” have noticeably synchronized. The only difference is that Washington is set on a more confrontational stance and is potentially ready to expand pressure on Tehran, including into the military sphere. This was already proven in practice in June 2025 by Operation “Midnight Hammer,” when Washington struck Iranian nuclear facilities. At the same time, the Europeans remain focused on using only diplomatic and economic tools.

The nuclear problem is merely a pretext to limit the Iranian side’s activity, while the West’s real claims against Tehran are much broader, notes orientalist Yuri Mavashev, a teacher at the Department of World Politics and World Economy of the Institute of Management, RANEPA.

“Essentially, Germany, France, and Great Britain have supported and continued the US position regarding Iran. This position consists of excluding Iran from regional, macro-regional processes. In the West’s understanding, Tehran began to play too active a role without asking permission from Western capitals,” the expert concludes.

At the same time, even after the restoration of all international sanctions, Tehran still has “loopholes,” since Russia and China have stated that they do not consider the Security Council’s actions on this issue legitimate. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs pointed to gross violations and “simplifications” in the launch of the “snapback”. In particular, Europe, in its strive to increase pressure on Tehran, “skipped” several steps of the bureaucratic process. First, the parties must examine the claims in the dispute resolution mechanism. And only if everything reaches a dead end should the issue be brought to the UN Security Council. This mechanism, contrary to the assertions of the ‘Euro-three,’ was not activated. London, Paris, and Berlin skipped these stages and immediately submitted the paper to the Security Council, recalled the official representative of the department, Maria Zakharova.

The legitimacy of the current version of the “snapback” is further undermined by the fact that the Western guarantors of the deal have themselves repeatedly demonstrated double standards in interpreting the provisions of the JCPOA, aside from the US unilateral withdrawal from the deal in 2018 during Trump’s first term. For example, the “Euro-three” ignored the fact of one party’s withdrawal from the deal (which automatically freed Tehran from most of its obligations) and used the moment as a starting point for introducing new sanctions in 2023. They justified the decision there by stating that the Iranian side was not complying with the deal’s provisions, which had lost their force. Thus, Western states did not allow the process of restoring the nuclear deal with Tehran to be implemented fully, emphasizes Ilya Shcherbakov, an employee of the Department of International Relations and Integration Processes at the Faculty of Political Science, Moscow State University.

Nevertheless, UN Security Council Resolution 2231 in support of the Iranian nuclear deal will cease to be in effect on the day the JCPOA expires, October 18, 2025, and there is still time for negotiations.

How Iran Will Respond to the Restoration of Sanctions

The restoration of UN Security Council sanctions will seriously impact the domestic political situation in Iran. It will primarily complicate life for the reformist wing, since the course towards “rapprochement through dialogue” declared by Pezeshkian ultimately did not justify itself. And considering that the previous attempt by reformers to negotiate with the West, back under President Hassan Rouhani, who secured the conclusion of the first deal, also ended in failure, the conviction in the futility of negotiations has only strengthened. The drift of sentiment towards the conservative camp has accelerated and risks soon manifesting itself in foreign policy as well.

The most obvious step is Iran’s withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Moreover, Tehran has been threatening this since June 2025, when its territory was attacked by Israel and the USA. In the conservatives’ view, this decision should be an open signal to its opponents in the West that the country does not intend to sacrifice national interests in exchange for ephemeral promises.

Incidentally, on the morning after the Security Council meeting, the Iranian parliament convened in closed session to discuss the country’s possible withdrawal from the treaty. For now, however, only an exchange of views on this matter has taken place, and a draft law prepared back in the summer has not been launched. It cannot be ruled out that additional symbolic steps will be timed for October 18—on that date, according to the first edition of the JCPOA, the last restrictions were supposed to be lifted from Tehran.

In Brussels, they are convinced that Tehran will continue to “take it out” exclusively on the IAEA, including because for the majority of ordinary Iranians, the “nuclear issue” is associated exclusively with this organization, by limiting the transparency of its atomic industry. However, Tehran is unlikely to decide to withdraw from the NPT, one of the diplomats of the “Euro-three” countries told Reuters on condition of anonymity. In their opinion, China or Russia are unlikely to approve of Iran hastily creating an atomic bomb. In June, Vladimir Putin stated that Russia is against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by anyone, including Iran.

Indeed, a hypothetical Iranian withdrawal from the NPT would weaken the stability of the thesis about the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian atomic program, which official Tehran constantly emphasizes, and would give its regional opponents, primarily Israel, an argument for radical actions. And therefore, Tehran will most likely adhere to the tactic of “intimidation” for now: continuing to keep opponents in tension but not crossing new “red lines.”

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About the Author: Dr. Leonid Tsukanov holds a Doctorate in Political Science and is an esteemed expert with the Russian International Affairs Council. As an international journalist and Orientalist, Dr. Tsukanov specializes in analyzing the intricate dynamics of global security and Middle Eastern affairs. In 2022, he was awarded the prestigious G.M. Evstafiev Award for young specialists in international security and nuclear non-proliferation (PIR Center). In 2023, he won the competition for international journalists in the category of “Best Analytical Article on International Issues” (RIAC/Union of Journalists of Russia). He has authored several books and published over 100 scholarly and analytical articles, focusing on contemporary security challenges facing nations in the MENA region.