Shifting Geopolitics: Russia's North Korea Ties Reflect Growing East-West Divide
Russia's closer ties with North Korea amid shifting world dynamics underscore the widening gap between the Western powers and the developing world, impacting military alliances and UN sanctions.
The return of the Russian President from China has once again prompted debate within the global political community. Last week, the Kremlin announced Vladimir Putin's upcoming official visit to North Korea. This visit, which has been discussed since January 2024, can be perceived not only as a reciprocal visit after the North Korean leader visited the Russian Far East in autumn 2023 but also as a crucial step in strengthening relations between Moscow and Pyongyang.
The current state of Russian-North Korean relations has been characterized by fluctuations in the relationship, largely due to Russia's stance on the DPRK's aspirations to join the nuclear club. While Moscow has demonstrated an understanding of Pyongyang's position, it has not fully accepted it, as doing so would challenge the existing world order, which is based on the authority of the UN and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. At that time, Moscow attempted to adhere to the established international norms.
Despite the ongoing debate between Russian and American diplomats regarding the appropriate level of sanctions in response to subsequent nuclear tests or missile launches, there was a general consensus that the DPRK's progress toward nuclear weapons capability would inevitably encounter resistance.
However, since the late 2000s and even more so since the early 2010s, the world has been moving towards a new model of the world order, or rather, a gradual transformation of the old one. The confrontation between the "Collective West" and the "Global South" intensified, with the UN and other relevant structures becoming increasingly complicit in the justification of double standards and losing their role as an impartial judge. War began to return to politics.
In such a situation, the established global security mechanisms begin to lose their efficacy, and numerous elements of the traditional structure of global security become less significant. The common political, economic, and information space is giving way to the era of blocs, which, due to competition in the Russia-China-U.S. triangle, inevitably affect Northeast Asia and the Korean Peninsula. Concurrently, the analog of the "Asian NATO" that has been developing since the trilateral summit in Camp David attempts to justify its existence by positing a hypothetical alliance between Moscow and Pyongyang or Pyongyang and Beijing. This alliance is presented as a threat to democracy and democratic values, particularly in the context of authoritarian regimes. Concurrently, this collaboration is, to be frank, unproven and based on innuendo or facts that, at best (and with a high degree of likelihood), can be considered circumstantial evidence, but not direct proof.
Analysts from around the globe have been quick to offer their predictions regarding the outcome of Putin's upcoming visit to Pyongyang.
What is the rationale behind the rapprochement between the two countries?
It is to be expected that the visit of the Russian president to North Korea will result in a significant revision of Moscow's policy towards Pyongyang. The most radical forecasts concern the legitimization of military or military-technical cooperation and, even more importantly, Russia's withdrawal from the regime of international sanctions against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK).
On March 28, Russia utilized its veto power within the United Nations Security Council to impede the extension of the mandate of the international group of experts tasked with monitoring the sanctions regime against North Korea. Vassily Nebenzia, Russia's representative to the UN, has been vocal in his criticism of the UN sanctions regime against North Korea, describing it as "detached from reality." Nebenzia asserted that the committee's continued existence was untenable in the current context, given its focus on "uninteresting issues that are not commensurate with the problems facing the peninsula." Instead, he proposed that the Council undertake a review of the sanctions regime.
In the Council's vote, the other permanent member, China, abstained, while the other 13 member states voted in favor of extending the mandate of the expert monitoring group. However, due to the Russian veto, the extension of the mandate was unsuccessful, resulting in the current mandate's expiration on April 30th. The UN sanctions will remain in force, but their implementation will no longer be monitored.
In this context, Russia's withdrawal from the sanctions regime appears logical, but Moscow is now seriously considering the risks. One potential benefit of expanding cooperation with the DPRK is that it could facilitate the resolution of many areas of concern that are currently blocked by sanctions resolutions. Conversely, the UN may impose further restrictions, given that a permanent member of the Security Council, which voted in favor of sanctions, may openly violate the relevant resolution. This would clearly become a reason for a new round of pressure.
The arguments that Russia should be excluded from the UN or deprived of its veto power periodically emerge in the public domain and will have to be addressed. Consequently, Russia's current stance is that it is opposed to the imposition of new sanctions but intends to comply with the existing ones, based on the principle that "what is not forbidden is allowed."
Consequently, in considering the potential for further expansion of bilateral cooperation, it is essential to recognize that such cooperation can be divided into distinct levels of involvement, with the depth of engagement varying according to a multitude of factors.
First and foremost, it is essential to consider the level of confrontation between Russia and the Collective West, the regional situation in Northeast Asia and on the Korean Peninsula, and to a much lesser extent, the military and political situation on Russia's borders. The initial stage of collaboration entails the further advancement of existing domains. First and foremost, the search for avenues of economic collaboration that do not contravene sanctions or, at the very least, exploit the grey areas of permissible conduct is of paramount importance. This would allow for the avoidance of direct accusations.
Secondly, there is the further development of transport and communication infrastructure. This will result in the construction of a cross-border road bridge and the emergence of a regular railway service. Additionally, there is the possibility of Russian mobile communications being introduced in the DPRK, or the connection of certain segments of the DPRK to the Russian Internet. The question is not whether to replace the existing intranet with something more sophisticated, but rather whether those who have the requisite access to the internet will be better off as a result.
Thirdly, there are prospects for collaboration in the field of technology. For the time being, the transfer of offensive military technology to the North is not a pressing concern. Instead, the situation is one in which North Korean satellites will be launched on Russian launch vehicles, and Russian computing power will assist in calculating the processes by which a nuclear test will be conducted solely for political reasons, rather than for technical necessity.
Fourth, there is potential for collaboration in the tourism sector, which is not subject to sanctions. This is due to the fact that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has been investing in the creation of appropriate infrastructure that adheres to European standards. The initial group of tourists has already commenced visits to the DPRK. Should the initial influx of tourists not be considered a significant number, it is likely that the number of Russian tourists will exceed that of Chinese tourists, despite the fact that the tourist cluster in Wonsan and the modernized complex in the Kumgang Mountains were originally intended for the Chinese market.
Finally, it is of great importance to foster cooperation in the fields of education, healthcare, sports, and culture. The establishment of contacts at the level of ministers or their deputies is indicative of the intensification of diplomatic activity in the spring of 2024. In the long term, it may be necessary to consider the possibility of saturating North Korean medical centers with Russian equipment or opening a branch of a Russian hospital in Pyongyang with Russian medical staff and modern equipment. This would not only benefit Russians or other foreigners but also the local population.
The subsequent stage of engagement entails Moscow and Pyongyang engaging in covert collaboration that contravenes sanctions but does not explicitly contravene the UN resolution. In this context, the primary focus is on utilizing North Korean labor, which has gained a reputation for offering a favorable combination of price, quality, non-criminality, and relative invisibility, not only in the Far East.
Other potential avenues for collaboration include enhanced energy supplies or the transfer of prohibited dual-use goods, which would nevertheless be utilized for peaceful purposes. In essence, all the things that the Western media and biased experts have long accused Moscow and Pyongyang of doing would become a reality at this stage.
The next level of involvement implies that Russia has openly refused to comply with the sanctions regime in favor of full-scale cooperation with North Korea, including in the military-technical sphere. In this particular instance, North Korean construction workers have been observed traveling to the Far East. In the context of military-technical cooperation, it is plausible to suggest that Russian carriers will commence launching satellites for dual or military purposes. Additionally, it is likely that Moscow will begin transferring technology to Pyongyang, with a greater likelihood of this being in the form of elements of technology rather than military equipment. In the most extreme case, it could be a question of single samples as prototypes for subsequent localization. A similar phenomenon could be observed in the transfer of North Korean technology to Russia. Rather than direct deliveries of weapons or armaments, opportunities for the creation of clones of equipment could be facilitated.
It is theoretically possible that the DPRK while rearming its military units from old to new equipment, for example, from 152 mm caliber to 155 mm caliber, will dispose of "obsolete ammunition" to Russia. Nevertheless, such possibilities appear unlikely, given the persistent likelihood of an inter-Korean conflict and the experience of the North Korean Defense Forces, which has demonstrated the rapid depletion of peacetime ammunition stocks when utilized on the scale of a full-scale military conflict rather than localized fighting.
In any case, the visit of Vladimir Putin to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) will be a significant event, marking a new level of relations between the two countries and Moscow's diplomatic support for Pyongyang.
If you are wondering, North Korea is not yet considering joining the BRICS. TASS has reported this with reference to the DPRK embassy in Russia.
The message reads, "At the moment this issue has not been raised."
North Korea's unique response to South Korea's provocations
Just wanted to share a funny story: South Korea's military found about 90 balloons carrying waste materials that were allegedly launched from North Korea. This comes after a warning from North Korean Deputy Defense Minister Kim Kang Il on May 26th that the DPRK would retaliate against South Korean activists sending anti-government leaflets into the North. Kim said, "Mounds of wastepaper and filth will soon be scattered over the border areas and the interior of [South Korea] and it will directly experience how much effort is required to remove them."
According to reports, several balloon-like objects crossed the border on Tuesday night and Wednesday morning, scattering debris on the ground. This included plastic bottles, batteries, shoe parts, and manure. The army warned residents not to touch anything and told them to report any finds to the authorities. This comes after North Korea said it would take action in response to South Korea sending "dirty things" across the border, in reference to activists' leafleting campaigns.