Is BRICS so attractive for China?
The Great Trade Reroute: Navigating China’s High-Tech Ambitions in a BRICS-Centric World
The global economic architecture of the early 21st century was famously built on a single, massive pillar: the trade relationship between the United States and China. For decades, this “world factory” and its primary consumer acted as the engine of globalization. However, as we navigate the turbulent waters of late 2025, that pillar is showing significant structural cracks. In his compelling research presentation, “Is BRICS so attractive for China?”, young economist Andrey Gnidchenko of the Center for Macroeconomic Analysis and Short-Term Forecasting (CMASF) provides a data-driven autopsy of these shifts. His work, presented at the XIII Annual Conference on the World Economy, offers a window into how China is surviving—and even thriving—amidst a “new US trade policy” defined by rising tariffs and geopolitical friction.
The 2025 Trade Paradox: Rerouting Over Reorienting
The headline from Gnidchenko’s findings is a surprising one: despite the implementation of aggressive new tariffs in early 2025, global trade has not slowed to the crawl many experts predicted. While organizations like the WTO and IMF expected a slump to 1% growth, the reality was a robust 4.2% increase by late 2025. Remarkably, China’s export growth reached a staggering 8.7% during this same period. How did Beijing achieve this?
The answer lies in two strategic maneuvers: trade redirecting and trade rerouting. “Redirecting” involves finding entirely new markets to buy Chinese goods. “Rerouting,” however, is more of a strategic sleight of hand—selling the same goods to the same markets (like the US) but through intermediary nations like Vietnam or Mexico to bypass direct tariff barriers.
Gnidchenko points out that while the US remains China’s “natural partner” due to its massive and wealthy consumer base, direct trade flows between the two have dropped “markedly” in 2025. To compensate, China has flooded markets in Europe and ASEAN. Interestingly, this surge in exports wasn’t always driven by new demand; in sectors like steel, a drop in Chinese domestic construction led to a “flooding” of the world market, with China’s share of global steel exports jumping from 5% to 30%.
The BRICS Reality Check
For those who view the BRICS bloc (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, and its new members) as a ready-made replacement for Western markets, Gnidchenko’s research offers a sobering reality check. Currently, BRICS is highly attractive to China as a source of resources, but it remains underwhelming as a destination for high-tech exports.
China’s reliance on the bloc for raw materials is undeniable. Brazil has seen its exports to China grow to three times the volume of its exports to the US, primarily in iron ore and foodstuffs like soybeans. Russia and Indonesia have similarly become vital resource pipelines. Yet, when it comes to selling advanced Chinese products—like the sophisticated electric vehicles (EVs) and high-end electronics Beijing is now prioritizing—the BRICS bloc faces a “simple reason” for its lack of attractiveness: low average per capita income.
China is attempting to move up the value chain, focusing on high-value-added products like solar panels and accumulators. To succeed, it needs “deep” markets where consumers have high purchasing power. Most BRICS nations, while large, lack this depth. This creates a strategic mismatch: China wants to sell the future, but its closest political allies are still largely middle- or low-income economies.
Envisioning the Impact: Three Potential Future Scenarios
Drawing on Gnidchenko’s analysis of the current trade architecture, we can extrapolate three realistic scenarios for how these findings might shape the world over the next decade.
Scenario 1: The Rise of the “Technological Sovereign” and Regional Assembly Hubs
As China faces increasing barriers in developed markets, we might see an aggressive push toward technological sovereignty. In this scenario, China treats high-tech chips as the “new oil,” investing heavily to ensure critical imports cannot be interrupted by Western sanctions.
To bypass tariffs, Chinese firms may move from merely “rerouting” goods to a strategy of localized production. We would likely see a surge in Chinese outward foreign direct investment (FDI) into neighboring ASEAN and BRICS countries. Instead of “Made in China,” sophisticated goods would be “Assembled in Vietnam” or “Produced in Malaysia” by Chinese-owned factories. This would lead to a massive transfer of industrial infrastructure to Southeast Asia, potentially accelerating the economic development of these regions while allowing China to maintain its market share in the West under a different label.
Scenario 2: The “Snowball Effect” and the South-South Consumer Pivot
If BRICS continues its current expansion—potentially adding fast-growing ASEAN nations as it did with Vietnam, Malaysia, or Indonesia—the bloc could reach a “snowball effect” of intra-regional trade. In this scenario, the “low per capita income” hurdle is gradually cleared by collective growth.
As these economies mature and their young populations enter the middle class, the demand for sophisticated Chinese goods could finally match China’s supply. We might witness the birth of a truly independent “South-South” trade architecture that no longer relies on the US or Europe as the “ultimate consumer”. Policy-wise, this would require a shift in China’s own strategy: moving from being an export-driven factory to a domestic-driven market that also imports specialized goods from its BRICS partners. This creates a more balanced, multi-polar world where innovation is shared across the Global South, potentially leading to faster technological integration in regions that were previously “digitally excluded”.
Scenario 3: The Resource Dependency Trap vs. Green Innovation
A more cautious scenario involves China becoming caught in a resource dependency trap with its BRICS partners. If China continues to view Russia, Brazil, and Indonesia primarily as “quarries and farms,” it may prioritize resource security over environmental sustainability or balanced trade.
Economically, this could lead to a “two-speed” global order. China would focus its high-tech, green-energy innovations (like solar panels and EVs) on wealthy, high-standard markets in Europe or domestic consumers, while maintaining a traditional, extraction-based relationship with the rest of the BRICS bloc. This would create a paradox: China could become the global leader in green technology while simultaneously underwriting carbon-intensive resource extraction in partner nations to fuel its own industrial machine. This scenario highlights the tension between China’s geopolitical need for allies and its economic need for wealthy, sophisticated customers.
Why It Matters: A Multi-Speed Future
Andrey Gnidchenko’s research reminds us that “today is not tomorrow”. While the US remains the main destination for Chinese exports today, the “balance of power” is shifting toward rapidly growing, densely populated countries with young workforces, such as India, Indonesia, and Nigeria.
For the average person, these findings suggest that the products we use and where they are made will continue to change in confusing ways. A “Mexican” car might soon be a Chinese high-tech EV in disguise; a “Vietnamese” smartphone might be the product of a Chinese tech giant’s “localization” strategy.
Ultimately, China’s trade journey is a high-stakes balancing act. It must secure raw materials from the BRICS “resource well” while desperately seeking or creating “deep” markets capable of buying its high-tech future. Whether the BRICS bloc can transform from a supply chain of commodities into a coalition of high-tech consumers will be the defining economic story of the next decade. As the “Siberian snowball” of global trade alliances picks up speed, the world must prepare for an era where the old maps of commerce are no longer reliable guides.
Join the Conversation:
📌 Subscribe to Think BRICS for weekly geopolitical video analysis beyond Western narratives.






ASEAN as a whole is growing quite rapidly and could very well match China in per capita income. China could (and should) help ASEAN continue growing and becoming middle income countries with a high proportion of high income consumers.
China's great long term advantage is in its secure supply chains and closely knit product ecosystems. Coupled with general low-level AI and robotics, it is hard to see how competitors could break this advantage.
With this in mind, it might play to China's long-term advantage to transfer technology out to BRICS nations that are good allies, and support HUAWEI-style local-worker-owned cooperatives in allied BRICS countries.
Cooperatives, with their highly reduced exploitative models, are the best method for quickly raising local incomes. Such companies would be paying licencing back to China as rent, but the rest of the profit would be staying in the local economies, meaning the staff would be able to purchase the high-end Chinese products, and they would already be within the Chinese economic ecosystem.
Of course, this would require some of the 'altruism' that lead to China's AIs being released as open-source, and would be in stark contrast to the West's current laser-focus on rent-seeking across the board, no matter the social costs or damage to long term prosperity.
Oddly, China must take a clear look at the Opium Era, and understand some lessons from that. True, the British may well have come up with their dire plan anyway, but the way it is taught is that it was the catastrophic one-sided trade that pushed the British Empire into this move.
The Chinese Govt has already built so well, China will be experiencing real term growth for several decades, even if it all goes tits up right now in terms of continued investment (Hard to see how that could happen).
While they are still intent on reducing poverty for their public, and rightly so (Shame the West isn't so focussed, they might actually have a chance if they did), they should also be planning for when general living standards in China are so advanced, they will actually benefit more from raising living standards elsewhere, to create stability and general global prosperity.
Simply stacking ever more money will eventually bite them in the arse, Class systems will become stronger, and they will struggle not to fall into the trap the Western countries already have.
Fingers crossed the Chinese leadership understand this potential fate.