The Flexible Kingdom: What Saudi Arabia Will Get After Biden Leaves
Saudi Arabia’s changing stance on Israel signals a shift in its diplomatic approach, as it navigates U.S. elections and regional tensions.
A couple of days ago, Saudi Prince Turki bin Faisal, an experienced diplomat and intelligence officer, lashed out at the United States, criticizing its policy toward Israel.
He stated that there would be no normalization of relations between Riyadh and Tel Aviv, which Washington had been so insistent on, without the creation of a Palestinian state, and that Western partners should stop financing Israel's "military adventures".
At first glance, bin Faisal merely repeated the "political mantra" about the certainty of the creation of a Palestinian state, which Riyadh has been using for over 20 years.
However, there is an important detail in his words. For the first time in the years of partnership, the Saudis demanded that the United States stop all support for Israel. However, Saudi Arabia had never criticized its main ally for "ambiguous contacts" before and had even used them for its own purposes.
Taking into account previous statements by Saudi courtiers, it is clear that Riyadh is not inclined to normalize relations with Israel, at least not according to the formula that Washington is now imposing.
Friendship behind the scenes
Even though relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel have been tense throughout the history of the coexistence of the two states, Riyadh and Tel Aviv have not seen themselves as enemies for a long time.
Thus, the "political and economic boycott" of Israel since 2005 has existed only formally. Trade between the countries took place through small "shell" firms, and the intelligence services regularly exchanged information on the activities of terrorist and criminal groups, as well as on Iran's activities in the Middle East. Interaction in this format continued until 2020.
Everything changed with the launch of the Arab-Israeli reconciliation program under the auspices of the United States, called the "Abraham Accords". Several Arab countries joined it at once, including the UAE, with which Saudi Arabia is fighting for leadership in the Middle East. The Kingdom also took some symbolic steps (for example, opening an air corridor for planes flying to Israel), but did not go for a quick rapprochement.
Riyadh was almost persuaded to reconcile with Tel Aviv in 2023 - in exchange for Washington's assistance in developing Saudi "peaceful atom", lifting restrictions on arms and equipment purchases, large-scale investments in industry, and raising Saudi-American relations to the level of a special strategic partnership.
However, the conflict in Gaza put the "Deal of the Century" on hold.
Change of mood
Although the Saudis were among the first to condemn Israel's actions in the Gaza Strip, Riyadh has long tried to balance between the "protection of the historical rights" of the Palestinian people and its own political and economic interests, continuing to interact with Israel behind the scenes.
In the first months, the kingdom probably even hoped to finalize the normalization deal with minimal damage to its reputation.
In addition, Riyadh tried for some time to act as a peacemaker, offering the "Arab Peace Initiative" of 2002 as a basis for a settlement.
The Saudi "peace plan" assumed an end to the Arab-Israeli confrontation in exchange for the liberation of territories occupied by Israel following the Six-Day War of 1967, and the official recognition of Palestine with its capital in East Jerusalem.
However, due to the "irreconcilable differences" between Israel and Hamas, this could not be achieved, although the United States considered certain recommendations from its Arabian allies when developing the "Biden Plan".
Finally, Saudi Arabia "lent a shoulder" to Israel during Iran's Operation True Promise (April 2024), covering part of its airspace. This was also supposed to contribute to further rapprochement between the two countries.
However, over time, the Saudis' goodwill towards Israel is increasingly giving way to irritation.
The main reason is the fickle policy of the Israelis. Despite Washington's generous promises, it cannot guarantee that Saudi Arabia will get what it expects from the deal. Riyadh has repeatedly observed how easily Israel changes the rules of the game and goes against already agreed agreements, disregarding not only the interests of its regional counterparts but also the position of the White House.
The Saudis are right to fear that the "gentlemen's agreements" reached under the auspices of the United States will be violated by the Israelis. Especially if the party affiliation of the White House administration changes and no one will particularly monitor the fulfillment of the promises of their predecessors.
The change in mood is also being driven by pessimism about the implementation of the "peace plan" for Gaza. The recent meeting of mediators with Hamas representatives in Doha ended in nothing.
The movement continues to demand that Israeli troops completely leave Gaza, and only after that is it ready to begin an exchange of hostages. Israel, meanwhile, continues to consolidate its position on the southern border of the enclave and is reacting with hostility to any proposals to leave the occupied positions.
The flywheel of the conflict continues to spin: for the first time since the beginning of Operation Iron Swords in Gaza, the Israeli Cabinet updated its goals, including in the list "the safe return of northern residents to their homes."
This formulation very transparently hints at Israel's intention to make a dash to the border in the near future, in order to engage Lebanese Hezbollah in battle. For Riyadh, this is fraught with the activation of the entire network of Iranian proxy forces and new surges in tension on its borders.
In addition to all this, Saudi Arabia is irritated by the fact that the US is trying to resolve selfish issues under the plausible pretext of normalization and renewal of allied ties - to squeeze Chinese companies out of the Saudi market and limit the military-political dialogue between Beijing and Riyadh. The kingdom, which claims the status of a regional pole of power, does not intend to tolerate such an open encroachment on national sovereignty.
Turn to the advantage
The timing is very opportune for demonstrating determination: there are less than two months left before the US elections, and the “Saudi rebellion” (as well as the likely failure of the Gaza deal) will “count” for Joe Biden, whose political career is approaching its end anyway.
While the main candidates for the presidential post – Democrat Kamala Harris and Republican Donald Trump – are hardly feeling the consequences of the temporary cooling of US-Saudi relations.
Riyadh understands perfectly well that the new White House administration cannot do without an “anchor” ally in the Persian Gulf, which was able to maintain a balance between Palestine and Israel, without allowing a critical tilt to either side.
So, after the failure of the “Biden Plan” for Gaza, Washington will have no choice but to accept the Saudi concept of a settlement, making Riyadh a key mediator in the negotiations.
At the same time, Saudi Arabia does not plan to finally remove the issue of normalizing relations with Israel. Given its flexibility in the issue of supporting Palestinian statehood, the “demonstration of readiness” of the Israelis to work on the project will be quite enough for it.
However, the conditions for rapprochement will differ significantly from those put forward a year ago - this time in favor of Riyadh. In this sense, it will remain in the black, regardless of who occupies the White House.
About the Author: Dr. Leonid Tsukanov holds a Doctorate in Political Science and is an esteemed expert with the Russian International Affairs Council. As an international journalist and Orientalist, Dr. Tsukanov specializes in analyzing the intricate dynamics of global security and Middle Eastern affairs. In 2022, he was awarded the prestigious G.M. Evstafiev Award for young specialists in international security and nuclear non-proliferation (PIR Center). In 2023, he won the competition for international journalists in the category of "Best Analytical Article on International Issues" (RIAC/Union of Journalists of Russia). He has authored several books and published over 100 scholarly and analytical articles, focusing on contemporary security challenges facing nations in the MENA region.
As it seems Saudi Arabia is still weighing its choice to join BRICS, all these shifts can make a difference with its ultimate choice. Surely it knows U$a & Israel cannot be trusted. Yet, all the deep ties it has with both cannot be entirely known yet. Extricating from the parasite that has a hand on everything, including family members, wealth & security is a delicate business. In time the paradise will weaken. It will devastate itself.